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BALANCING “AGGRESSION” AND COMPASSION 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:   
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION  
AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Alexander H. McCabe* 
 
There is a problematic overlap between bona fide humanitarian 
intervention and the crime of aggression.  Under international law, the 
crime of aggression is defined so vaguely that it potentially could be 
applied to try leaders who seek to stop documented mass atrocities with 
armed force.  This Note seeks a resolution to that overlap:  a path that 
would allow those who would plan and engage in bona fide humanitarian 
intervention to be exempt from prosecution for aggression.  The Note first 
examines the genealogy of the crime of aggression.  It then analyzes several 
possible solutions to policing aggression without unduly deterring 
humanitarian intervention.  Finally, this Note concludes that the existing 
imbalance can be corrected by:  (1) granting the International Criminal 
Court exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the crime of 
aggression, (2) modifying the current regulations to bar the U.N. Security 
Council in prosecuting the crime of aggression, and (3) developing an 
affirmative defense to the crime of aggression that would allow indicted 
leaders to use either a high or low evidentiary standard depending on 
whether their state acted alone or through a multilateral organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Something is rotten in the fictional state of Bellicosia.  The small state 
has been brutally occupying and destroying cities in its restive eastern part.  
While the government claims to be crushing an open rebellion, the world 
media and local opposition groups have, for months, spread stories of 
indiscriminate use of armed force against civilians.  There are rumors of 
torture and the deliberate bombing of local hospitals and schools.  Since the 
majority of the population in this region consists of an ethnic minority, 
accusations of genocide gain traction. 
While some member states at the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) 
strongly advocate a humanitarian military intervention to stop these 
atrocities, a powerful Bellicosian ally threatens to veto any resolution 
authorizing armed force.  Back-channel negotiation and threats of serious 
economic sanctions prove unsuccessful. 
Finally, an international alliance acts.  Heads of state, cabinet officials, 
and military leaders from the world’s most powerful nations plan and carry 
out an extended bombing campaign against government and military 
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targets.  They later invade from neighboring states, occupying eastern 
Bellicosia and effectively ending any military activity in the region. 
Back at the United Nations, Bellicosian allies and other states—
concerned with what they perceive as the powerful alliance’s gross 
flaunting of restrictive international norms on the use of armed force—
demand that the International Criminal Court (ICC) act against the alliance 
heads of state, cabinet, and military officials for planning and executing 
crimes of aggression against Bellicosia.1  The ICC prosecutor launches an 
investigation against these leaders.  The vague definitions of the “crime of 
aggression” and who can be prosecuted for it sparks a detailed and 
confusing international legal debate.  Any hope that states once had for the 
ICC to be a respected part of international criminal law is buried under 
ambiguities and questions of procedure. 
This Note concerns the concept of “aggression” in international law and 
the past and future practice of prosecuting individuals for the “crime of 
aggression.”  It asks, and attempts to answer, three critical questions:  
(1) what is the crime of aggression and who gets to define it, (2) whom can 
we prosecute for the crime and who decides who shall be prosecuted, and 
(3) how can we ensure that state leaders and officials who use armed forces 
in a foreign country for legitimate humanitarian reasons do not get 
prosecuted for the crime? 
To that end, Part I discusses the crime of aggression and humanitarian 
intervention, touching on their past histories and current state.  Part II 
reviews the literature proposing both procedural and substantive solutions 
to address the problematic overlap.  Part III critically assesses these 
solutions and concludes that (1) under international law the crime of 
aggression is still unclear but that a working definition sufficient to generate 
indictments can be pieced together from customary international law; (2) 
the ICC should have complete and exclusive jurisdiction for defining and 
prosecuting crimes of aggression as the international political branches—
namely the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council—are 
unable to provide a fair trial and have proven to be too political in their past 
usage of aggression to be reliable; and (3) in the interest of protecting bona 
fide humanitarian interveners, the court should establish a two-tier 
affirmative defense.  The two tiers establish a high standard of evidence 
when the initiator of force is outside of the target state’s region and a lower 
tier when regional multilateral organizations from within the target’s region 
initiate. 
I.   WALKING THE TIGHTROPE:  THE BALANCE AS IT STANDS 
This part clarifies the crime of aggression and humanitarian intervention 
as they currently stand in international law.  It first provides a brief 
background of international law sources.  It then examines the crime of 
aggression and “act of aggression” definitions as they have developed over 
time and as they currently stand today, dividing the sources between 
 
 1. “Crimes of aggression” are defined infra Part I.B. 
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treaties, customary international law, and general principles.  Finally, it 
examines emerging international legal standards for humanitarian 
intervention. 
A.   Sources and Enforcement of International Law 
International law has a variety of sources, which are memorialized in the 
U.N.-created Statute of the International Court of Justice.2  Article 38 of the 
statute lists three groups of sources:  (1) international conventions and 
treaties, (2) customary international law, and (3) the general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations.3 
Treaties and international conventions are written, contract-like 
documents by which states explicitly agree to be bound.4  They are the 
dominant form of international law and are interpreted according to 
principles outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.5  
Article 31(1) of that convention provides that “a treaty shall be 
interpreted . . . in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”6  If interpreting this plain meaning creates an “ambiguous or 
obscure” or “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result, the treaty’s 
preparatory work (i.e., legislative history) and the “circumstances of its 
conclusion”—collectively known as the “travaux préparatoires”—may be 
used as a supplementary interpretative aid.7 
The U.N. Charter is the preeminent international legal treaty, superior to 
all other legal obligations that any of its signatories may have.8  It created 
the United Nations which continually acts to shape international law 
through its various bodies, primarily the UNSC and the UNGA.9  Article 25 
of the U.N. Charter binds member states to carry out Security Council 
decisions.10  UNGA resolutions are recommendations and thus usually 
nonbinding,11 but they do contribute to customary international law.12  The 
U.N. Charter directly addresses and regulates the legality of uses of armed 
force in international affairs.13 
 
 2. U.N. Charter art. 92–96; JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2013). 
 3. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 4. KLABBERS, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
 5. Id. at 26–27. 
 6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Counvention]. 
 7. Id. at art. 32. 
 8. U.N. Charter art. 103. 
 9. Id. at art. 9–22 (creating and detailing the General Assembly’s structure and 
procedures), id. at art. 23–32 (creating and detailing the Security Council’s structure and 
procedures). 
 10. Id. at art. 25. 
 11. Id. at art. 10, 14; GERHARD KEMP, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME OF AGGRESSION 117 (2010). 
 12. KLABBERS, supra note 2, at 87. 
 13. U.N. Charter art. 33–38;  see also id. at art. 1. 
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Customary international law is international law framed by the practices 
of nations performed out of a sense of legal obligation.14  Accordingly, 
custom may evolve as state practices evolve, so long as the changes are 
attributable to a change in expectations of what law requires—opinio 
juris.15 
The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations refers to 
rules of international law drawn from underlying principles of the world’s 
major legal systems.16  One example is “due process of law”:  most of the 
world’s states, including those with the most political and economic 
influence, accept the principle that a person is entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before a government takes away his or her liberty or 
property. 
B.   Crimes of Aggression:  The History and Current State 
This section discusses the history and current state of the crime of 
aggression in international law.  It first discusses the relevant international 
conventions and treaties,17 then customary international law,18 and finally 
the general principles relevant to defining acts of aggression.19 
It is important to note that an act of aggression, as discussed in the U.N. 
Charter, and a crime of aggression are two separate and distinct concepts.20  
The act is the state-performed violation, while the crime is the individual 
criminal liability that the instigator or planner of an act of aggression may 
face.21  While a state commits an act of aggression, an individual commits a 
crime of aggression.22 
1.   International Conventions and Treaties 
As discussed above, international conventions and treaties are the 
primary and most widely used international law sources today.23  Both the 
crime and act of aggression are codified in two such sources:  the U.N. 
Charter and the Rome Statute—which set forth the design and jurisdiction 
of the ICC. 
 
 14. KLABBERS, supra note 2, at 26–27. 
 15. Jonathan I. Charney, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” in 
Editorial Comments:  NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 836 (1999). 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(1)(c)(4) (1987). 
 17. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 20. Richard L. Griffiths, International Law, the Crime of Aggression and the Ius Ad 
Bellum, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 301, 309–10 (2002). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Ioana Gabriela Stancu, Defining the Crime of Aggression or Redefining Aggression?, 
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 87, 88 (Mauro 
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004). 
 23. See supra Part I.A. 
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a.   The U.N. Charter 
Since its inception after the carnage of World War II, the U.N., through 
its founding charter, has made the prevention of “acts of aggression” its 
highest priority.  Among the “[p]urposes of the United Nations” is “to 
maintain international peace and security” by suppressing “acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace.”24  To this end, article 2 calls 
upon members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against . . . any state” in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.25 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, comprising articles 39 to 51, gives the 
Security Council the power to determine the existence “of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and react appropriately.26  
Specifically, article 40 allows the Council, before determining the existence 
of an article 39 threat, to demand provisional measures of the relevant states 
to cease their offending actions.27  Article 42 allows the Council to 
authorize military force “to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”28  Article 51 notes that while nothing in the charter shall impair a 
state’s right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack, the Council 
reserves the right to take any action to maintain and restore international 
peace and security that it sees fit.29 
But what exactly is an act of aggression?  The U.N. Charter never 
specifically defines it,30 though Germany and Japan’s wars of aggression 
were certainly the historical precedent the U.N.’s founders had in mind.31  
These same founders, however, feared that struggling with a definition 
would bring the Charter Conference to a standstill, and so left it to the 
Security Council to decide what constitutes the act, a threat to peace, and an 
attack on peace on a case-by-case basis.32 
b.   The Rome Statute and the Kampala Conference Amendments 
The Rome Statute is a 2002 international treaty that established the 
ICC.33  The treaty vested the ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of 
 
 24. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 25. Id. at art. 2, para. 4. 
 26. Id. at art. 39. 
 27. Id. at art. 40. 
 28. Id. at art. 42. 
 29. Id. at art. 51. 
 30. Umberto Leanza, The Historical Background, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 1, 4 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004). 
While Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was later used as a basis for an “act of aggression” 
definition, there is no indication that this was the intent of the original document. 
 31. See KEMP, supra note 11, at 104. 
 32. Id. at 4–5. 
 33. The Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, the first day of the month after 
sixty days from the date the sixtieth state had ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded it. See 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 126, para. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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aggression.34  Some countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and their Western allies opposed the inclusion of the crime in the 
court’s jurisdiction in large part because of the potential for their leaders 
and generals to be prosecuted for aggression.35  However, a coalition of 
many European Union states and approximately thirty members of the 
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries made their support of the Rome 
Statute contingent on its inclusion.36  Because of how contentious this issue 
was, the conference’s chairman brokered a compromise that asserted 
jurisdiction over “crimes of aggression” but left decisions on the crime’s 
definition and the details of that jurisdiction to a future conference.37  To 
create and research a workable definition, the conference created the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) which met 
numerous times between 2003 and 2009.38  The 2010 Kampala Conference 
largely adopted the working group’s findings into the so-called Kampala 
Amendment, but the resulting definition will not go into force until after 
approval at another conference to be held before 2017.39 
Under the definition adopted at Kampala, an individual can be prosecuted 
for a crime of aggression if he or she (1) is “in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action[s] of a 
State” and (2) has been involved in the “planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution” of an act of aggression that “by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”40 
The Kampala Amendment further specifies that an act of aggression is 
“the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” essentially mirroring 
the language of U.N. Charter article 2(4).41  The amendment specifically 
names the same seven acts listed in UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) as 
“acts of aggression.”42 
 
 34. Id. at art. 5, para. 1. 
 35. See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 36. Elise LeClerc-Gagne & Michael Byers, A Question of Intent:  The Crime of 
Aggression and Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 379, 380 
(2009). 
 37. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 171 (2008). 
 38. International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, 7th Sess., Annex I, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009). 
 39. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, Uganda, May 31–June 11, 2010, RC/9/11, at 18 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
Review Conference], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-
11-ENG.pdf.  While this definition is not yet in full force, its adoption by consensus and 
imminent re-visitation make it an important text and interpretation to consider when 
discussing the crime of aggression. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Compare id., with U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”). 
 42. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 18.  See infra Part I.B.3.b. for a summary of 
the acts. 
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Finally, Annex III to the Kampala Amendment contains seven 
“Understandings” regarding the amendment’s legal interpretation.43  While 
this section is not part of the proposed additions to the Rome Statute’s text, 
some negotiating parties insisted on its addition to the annex to clarify 
certain sections.44  It is therefore, perhaps, most accurately considered a 
form of “soft law.” 
Understandings 1 through 5 cover procedural, jurisdictional, and 
precedential points.  Understandings 1 and 3 specify that the ICC may only 
exercise jurisdiction of UNSC-referred and ICC prosecutorial crime of 
aggression cases committed after the pre-January 1, 2017 meeting approves 
the amendment’s incorporation, or one year after ratification by thirty state 
parties.45  Understanding 2 extends ICC jurisdiction of UNSC-referred 
cases to individuals regardless of whether their state has accepted the 
court’s jurisdiction.46  Understandings 4 and 5 clarify that the act of 
aggression and crime of aggression definitions included in the amendment 
are solely for ICC purposes, not for “limiting or prejudicing in any way 
existing or developing rules of international law” nor do they create “the 
right or obligation” for a state to exercise domestic jurisdiction over an act 
of aggression committed by another state.47 
In contrast, Understandings 6 and 7 most directly address the definition 
of crimes and acts of aggression.48  Understanding 6 notes that aggression is 
the “most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force” and that—
in accordance with the U.N. Charter—all circumstances surrounding a 
particular case must be considered before determining such an act exists, 
including the act’s gravity and consequences.49  Understanding 7 clarifies 
the meaning of a “manifest violation” of the U.N. Charter noting that the 
three specified components—character, gravity, and scale—must each and 
collectively be sufficient to justify the “manifest determination.”50  These 
thresholds indicate that not every act of aggression is a basis for criminal 
prosecution.51  Indeed, the SWGCA meant “manifest” to exclude 
“borderline cases” or “those falling within a grey area” both factually and 
legally.52  In other words, where it is debatable that a state’s actions have 
 
 43. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 22. 
 44. Beth Van Schaak, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law:  The Crime of 
Aggression, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 596–97 (2010–11). 
 45. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 22. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. This echoes the Nuremberg Military Tribunal’s branding of aggression as the 
“supreme international crime.” See infra note 63. 
 48. Review Conference, supra note 39, at 22. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years Later:  Appraisal 
and Prospects, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 310 n.368 (2013).  This interpretation 
is also consistent with the Nuremberg Military Tribunals discussed supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 52. Jennifer Trahan, The Rome Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: 
Negotiations at the Kampala Review Conference, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 58 (2011) 
(citing February 2009 SWGCA Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION:  MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
51, 87 (Stefan Barriga, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber & Christian Wenaweser eds., 2009)). 
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the sufficient “character” or where they do not meet the required “gravity” 
or “scale”, an act is not a manifest violation.53 
It is currently unclear whether the “manifest” test would exclude 
borderline cases of humanitarian intervention, for instance, where there was 
no prior Security Council approval as was the case with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 1999 Kosovo bombings.54  The U.S. 
delegation explicitly proposed a humanitarian intervention exception to the 
“acts of aggression” definition which would have brought some clarity.55  
This proposal was met with “severe reluctance” by many delegates citing 
concerns over how to judge “good faith” and time constraints during the 
conference.56  The underlying concern was the possibility of pretextual 
invocations of humanitarian intervention by powerful states. 
2.   Customary International Law 
This section discusses the customary international law sources which 
inform the act of aggression and crime of aggression definitions.  It first 
considers the precedents set by the International Military Tribunals at 
Tokyo and Nuremberg.  Second, it looks to aggression as the U.N. Security 
Council and the General Assembly have defined it.  Finally, it discusses the 
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) treatment of aggression. 
a.   The History of the Crime of Aggression and 
the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
The genesis of the crime of aggression lies in the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles that ended World War I.57  The treaty called for the former 
German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm I, to be arraigned and tried before judges 
representing the allied powers for “a supreme offence against international 
morality and the sanctity of treaties.”58  This inchoate definition can be seen 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Van Schaak, supra note 44, at 565. 
 55. C. Kreβ & L. von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of 
Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1205 (2010).  The U.S. proposal for an 
understanding read in its entirety: 
It is understood that, for the purposes of the Statute, an act cannot be considered to 
be a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter unless it would be 
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with 
normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with 
an effort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 
or 8 of the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression. 
Laurie O’Connor, Humanitarian Intervention and the Crime of Aggression:  The Precarious 
Position of the “Knights of Humanity” 33–34 (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished Bachelor of 
Laws dissertation, University of Otago), available at http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/ 
research/journals/otago036321.pdf. 
 56. Kreβ & von Holtzendorff, supra note 55, at 1205; O’Connor, supra note 55, at 33–
34. 
 57. Griffiths, supra note 20, at 303 (“The Treaty of Versailles represents the first 
recognition by states that war could be criminally, as well as delictually, wrong.”). 
 58. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) art. 227, June 28, 1919, 2 
U.S.T. 43. 
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as a predecessor to aggression as it was articulated after World War II and 
memorialized in the U.N. Charter.  The tribunal was to be “guided by the 
highest motives of international policy” and incorporate the “obligations of 
international undertakings” and “international morality.”59  The fates, 
however, conspired to deny future scholars this precedent:  Kaiser 
Wilhelm I was given refuge in the Netherlands which refused to extradite 
him and the tribunal was never formed.60 
The first actual implementation of crime of aggression prosecution by 
international tribunals occurred after World War II.  The allied powers 
established International Military Tribunals at Tokyo and Nuremberg61 to 
hold those deemed war criminals liable for a number of “crimes against 
peace” and “war crimes” including waging “wars of aggression.”62  The 
Nuremberg court, in language later echoed at Kampala, went so far as to 
call instigating a war of aggression “the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the 
accumulated evil of the whole.”63  The case law of these tribunals remains 
the primary and most cited precedent for crime of aggression prosecution,64 
and thus warrants a close examination. 
Both the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East indicted dozens of former 
government and military officials for their involvement in aggressive war.65  
The charges against them criminalized both the planning and the active 
participation in the aggression.66  Famously, the tribunals rejected the 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. See MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR:  A COMPLETE HISTORY 523 (1994). 
 61. For an extensive account of the legal basis of and innovation that went into the 
International Military Tribunals, see NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL (2008); KEVIN JON HELLER, THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
(2011); and Zachary D. Kaufman, Transitional Justice for Tōjō’s Japan:  The United States 
Role in the Establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Other 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms for Japan After World War II, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 755 
(2013). 
 62. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(a), Jan. 19, 
1946, 4 U.S.T. 20 [hereinafter Tokyo Charter] (creating individual responsibility for a 
“crime against peace” defined as “the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
declared or undeclared war of aggression”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] 
(creating individual responsibility for “crimes against peace” defined as “planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression”). 
 63. Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 
172, 186 (1947). 
 64. KEMP, supra note 11, at 5. 
 65. See TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL 27–79 
(1947) [hereinafter NUREMBERG TRIAL]; Indictment, in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:  CHARTER, INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS 16–33 (Neil 
Boister & Robert Cryer eds., 2008) [hereinafter Tokyo Indictment]. 
 66. At the Tokyo Tribunal, Count 1 charged defendants with acting as “leaders, 
organizers, instigators, or accomplices” in the “formulation or execution of a common plan 
or conspiracy” to wage wars of aggression. Tokyo Indictment, supra note 65, at 18.  The 
other aggression-related counts on which the accused were convicted were waging a “war of 
aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, 
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defense that charged actions were committed under the orders of superiors67 
in holding with the scope of their official duties.68 
Because the judgments against the accused included the totality of so 
many different actions—and because the judgments are worded in a way 
that does not differentiate between the aggression and non-aggression 
counts—it is hard to isolate the specific acts that could trigger criminal 
liability.69 
It is useful, however, to look at the actions of those acquitted to see what 
did not constitute sufficient grounds to be liable for aggression.  At Tokyo, 
Iwane Matsui was the only defendant completely acquitted on all 
aggression charges against him.70  Although a general in the Japanese Army 
and, therefore, so closely associated with those who conceived and carried 
out the conspiracy to commit aggression that he “must have been aware” of 
their intentions, the court held that this mere association was insufficient to 
brand him as a conspirator.71  Similarly, merely carrying out his duties as a 
military officer in waging an aggressive war was insufficient to convict him 
for waging aggression since the prosecution never proved he had 
knowledge of the “criminal character of the war.”72  From these holdings, 
we can ascertain that only those involved in higher level planning than that 
of a field general and with the knowledge of aggressive intent—not simply 
carrying out their duties—are liable for the “crime of aggression.” 
The tribunals at Nuremberg support these conclusions.  There, ten 
defendants were completely acquitted of aggression charges.73  Martin 
Bormann, Chief of Staff at the Office of the Führer’s Deputy, was acquitted 
of participation in the conspiracy since his knowledge of the conspiracy was 
never proven, nor could it be conclusively inferred from the positions that 
he held.74  Hans Fritzsche, Head of the Radio Propaganda Ministry, was 
 
against” various allied nations. Id. at 25–26 (counts 27, 29, 31–33, 35). Count 36, concerning 
aggression actions against the USSR and Mongolia, includes the language “war of 
aggression in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances.” Id. 
(emphasis added).  At Nuremberg, the accused were charged and convicted with two 
aggression-related counts.  Count 1 indicted those who participated “as leaders, organizers, 
instigators, or accomplices” in a conspiracy to plan, prepare, initiate, or wage “wars of 
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, or 
assurances.” NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 65, at 29.  Count 2 charged the indicted with 
actually participating in the “planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of 
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and 
assurances.” Id. at 42. 
 67. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 62, at art. 8; Tokyo Charter, supra note 62, at art. 6. 
 68. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 62, at art. 7; Tokyo Charter, supra note 62, at art. 6. 
 69. See Majority Judgment:  Verdicts, in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL:  CHARTER, INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS 598–628 (Neil Boister & 
Robert Cryer eds., 2008) [hereinafter Tokyo Verdicts]. 
 70. See id.; see also app. 1. 
 71. Tokyo Verdicts, supra note 69, at 612. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See app. 1. Although Hans Frank and Fritz Sauckel were acquitted of their 
aggression crimes, available records give insufficient detail to identify specifics.  Thus, they 
are not included in the following analysis. NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 65, at 296 (Frank 
indictment), 320 (Sauckel indictment). 
 74. Id. at 338–39. 
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acquitted of the conspiracy charges since he never gained “sufficient stature 
to attend the planning conferences which led to aggressive war” and had no 
control over propaganda policies.75  Ernst Kaltenbrunner, a general officer 
in the Schutzstaffel (SS), was acquitted even though the prosecution had 
proven he committed an aggressive act because this act was not considered 
part of the aggressive war.76 
Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and Minister without 
Portfolio, was acquitted both on conspiracy and execution counts—despite 
being actively involved in German rearmament—because the prosecution 
never proved that (1) he was aware the rearmament was going to be used in 
aggressive wars and (2) he was close enough to the conspiracy to know of 
the aggressive war or influence its plans.77  Moreover, his actions 
(1) incorporating Austrian and Czech banks after annexation, (2) setting 
exchange rates, and (3) making violent pro-Nazi speeches were judged as 
insufficient to qualify as participation in the conspiracy to commit 
aggressive war.78 
Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, was acquitted 
on both aggression charges against him since his activities directing 
Germany’s armament industry were judged insufficient to be considered 
participating in the conspiracy or the waging of aggressive wars.79  The 
court reasoned that since he did not become head of the armament industry 
until after all aggressive wars had been initiated, his management “of 
German armament production [was] in aid of the war effort in the same way 
that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war.”80  The tribunal 
was not prepared to declare all such activities as qualifying as engaging in 
aggressive war.81 
Julius Streicher was acquitted since he was never in Hitler’s inner circle 
and there was no proof he had ever attended important conferences at which 
others planned the war or that he had knowledge of the created policies.82 
The court found that while Franz von Papen—Germany’s foreign 
representative in Vienna—engaged in “intrigue and bullying” which aided 
in the occupation of Austria, there was no evidence he was party to the 
plans that identified Austrian occupation as the first step in an aggressive 
war, nor was there evidence that he participated in the plans to occupy that 
country by aggressive war if necessary.83 
Baldur von Schirach—leader of Nazi youth group “Youth in the German 
Reich”—was actively involved in the militarization, pre-military training, 
and radicalization of Germany’s youth.84  Despite this, the court found that 
 
 75. Id. at 336–37. 
 76. Id. at 291–93. 
 77. Id. at 307–10. 
 78. Id. at 309–10. 
 79. Id. at 330–31. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 301–02. 
 83. Id. at 326–27. 
 84. Id. at 317–18. 
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he was not involved in the aggressive war conspiracy since he was not 
directly involved in Hitler’s plans for territorial expansion.85 
These cases inform the following guiding principles.  First, aggressive 
acts are separate from aggressive war and merely carrying out or being 
otherwise involved in the act is insufficient to convict for the criminal 
aggression.86  Secondly, not all actions in aid of an aggressive war effort are 
necessary to its planning qualify as the crime of aggression.87  Specifically, 
carrying out a general officer’s duties,88 being involved in the industrial 
planning that allows for rearmament,89 carrying out the financial 
transactions necessary for rearmament and the incorporation of annexed 
states,90 advancing propaganda,91 administrative work,92 youth 
radicalization and militarization,93 and foreign affairs intrigue94 are all—in 
and of themselves—insufficient.  Third, criminal liability requires 
conclusive evidence of (1) active participation in supporting the war of 
aggression and (2) knowledge of the aggressive nature of the war, either 
through direct involvement in the planning or otherwise.95  This second 
element appears to be the far more difficult of the two to prove since the 
prosecution could not do it for even high-ranking officials. 
While these tribunals were the first recognition that aggression was an 
offense, the allied powers alleged that these crimes and their prosecution 
were based on international law as it existed in 1939.96  This contention 
may have been debatable in the late-1940s, but today, the decisions of these 
tribunals and other subsequent developments make criminal liability for 
aggression an unquestionable part of current customary international law.97 
b.   UNSC Aggression Determinations 
The Security Council enjoys the power to determine “the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”98  Since 
the U.N. Charter uses these three separate terms it is reasonable to assume 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 291 (distinguishing the Anschluss as an “aggressive act” but not an “aggressive 
war” and acquitting Kaltenbrunner on conspiracy to commit aggressive war charges despite 
his involvement). 
 87. See supra notes 71–82 and accompanying text. 
 88. Tokyo Verdicts, supra note 69, at 611–12 (Matsui). 
 89. NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 66, at 307–09 (Schacht), 330–31 (Speer). 
 90. Id. at 307–09 (Schacht). 
 91. Id. at 336–37 (Fritzsche). 
 92. Id. at 338–39 (Bormann). 
 93. Id. at 317–18 (von Schirach). 
 94. Id. at 326–27 (von Papen). 
 95. CODIFICATION DIV., U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF 
DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION 74 (2003) [hereinafter U.N. AGGRESSION]; see 
also Tokyo Verdicts, supra note 69, at 611–12 (Matsui). 
 96. Griffiths, supra note 20, at 307. 
 97. Id. at 307–08. Additionally, UNGA resolution 95 (I) unanimously sanctioned the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the decisions issued by the tribunal. Leanza, supra 
note 30, at 3–4; see also LeClerc-Ganges & Byers, supra note 36, at 379–80. 
 98. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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that they are meant to have different meanings and, thus, that they cover 
different actions and levels of severity.99  Their separate usage as such 
across the U.N. Charter and General Assembly resolutions further supports 
such an interpretation.100  Original intent and subsequent usage in 
international law indicate that only the most severe actions qualify as acts 
of aggression.101  Therefore, in theory, there exists a hierarchy among the 
three Security Council determinable offenses:  a “threat to peace” is roughly 
equivalent to a threat to use force, a “breach of the peace” is an actual use 
of force or the consequences of a threat that have tangible results negatively 
affecting international peace and security, and an act of aggression is 
reserved for the most serious “breaches of the peace.”102 
In practice, the Security Council has defined “acts of aggression” quite 
differently.103  Notably, the Security Council has never used General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in defining aggression.104  While most 
condemnations were aimed at a series of general, unspecified acts, the 
specifically condemned acts reveal a set of actions which the Security 
Council believes constitute an act of aggression.105  These include:  an 
operation in which six aircrafts dropped five bombs in an airstrike, a small 
arms attack on a presidential palace and an airport, an attack against another 
nation’s capital which used small arms and bombs to kill twelve, two 
targeted assassinations and collateral loss of life, violence against 
diplomatic missions, and “armed invasions.”106  The action most common 
to these aggressive acts is the use of armed force against the victim state’s 
territorial integrity.107  Such actions, especially the targeted assassinations, 
fall far below the threshold that the textual definition of “acts of aggression” 
would suggest.108 
This list excludes several state actions that would seem unambiguous 
examples of aggression, including the Korean War, the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Falklands War, and several Israeli operations.109  This failure either resulted 
from aborted attempts at resolutions or a failure to even consider the 
situations.110 
 
 99. CARRIE MCDOUGALL, THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 65 (2013). Such a conclusion derives from a plain reading 
of the text as the Vienna Convention requires. See supra Part I.A. 
 100. MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 65. 
 101. Id. at 66–68. 
 102. Id. at 67–70. 
 103. See R. BELLELLI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE 
ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 507–10 (2010) (compilation of UNSC resolutions that have 
used “aggression”); O. SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 201 (2007); Weisbord, 
supra note 37, at 169.  McDougall argues that though the Security Council has used the word 
“aggression,” it is difficult to conclude that they have ever made an article 39 determination. 
See MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at ch. 6. 
 104. MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 83. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 84–85. 
 107. Id. at 85. 
 108. Id. at 86. 
 109. Weisbord, supra note 37, at 169. 
 110. Id. 
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Additionally, the list of “acts of aggression” betrays an extreme 
selectivity as to which countries the UNSC chooses to denounce.111  Out of 
the twenty resolutions, ten denounced apartheid South Africa, six were 
directed at the “racist regime” in Southern Rhodesia, two described and 
denounced Israel, one was against a multinational mercenary force, and one 
was against Iraq.112  The evidentiary record indicates that the Security 
Council’s use of aggression is more political and rhetorical than legal, and 
therefore, perhaps too unreliable to be of use in legal proceedings. 
c.   UNGA Aggression Determinations 
The UNGA also has branded actions as aggression in its own resolutions.  
Though they do not enjoy the binding “law” status of Security Council 
resolutions, they are admissible as empirical evidence of customary 
international law.  Resolution 498 (V) found that China’s intervention in the 
Korean War, as well as the actions of those it was supporting, constituted 
aggression.113  Resolution 1899 (XVIII) condemned South African 
incursions into South West Africa saying that “any attempt to annex a part 
or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of 
aggression.”114  In Resolution S-9/2 the UNGA denounced South Africa’s 
illegal occupation of Namibia and interference in Angola and Zambia as 
acts of aggression.115  The UNGA applied its 1974 definition of aggression 
to find the following South African acts of aggression against Namibia:  
illegal and colonial occupation in defiance of past UNGA and UNSC 
resolutions, military attacks against other African states launched from 
Namibia, specific attacks on Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, and its partial occupation of Angola.116  It further declared the 
following South African actions to constitute aggression:  attempts to 
“annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of [Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland]” (1962),117 armed intervention in Southern 
Rhodesia (1969),118 raiding Matola, Mozambique (January 1981) and 
invading Angola (July 1981) and the Seychelles (November 1981),119 
military aggression against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe,120 continued occupation of 
Angola and armed aggression against Lesotho and Mozambique,121 and 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 225–37; Weisbord, supra note 37, at 169. 
 113. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 242. 
 114. Id. at 242–43 (quoting G.A. Res. 1889 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/5605 (Nov. 6, 1963)). 
 115. Id. at 243. 
 116. Id. at 243–44. 
 117. Id. at 245 (citing G.A. Res. 1954 (XVII), at 8, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1277th plen. 
mtg. U.N. Doc. A/L.441 (Dec. 11, 1963)). 
 118. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 2508 (XXIV), U.N. Doc. A/7759 (Nov. 21, 1969)). 
 119. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 36/172C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/172[C] (Dec. 17, 1981)). 
 120. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 38/14, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/14 (Nov. 22, 1983)). 
 121. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 38/39C, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/39[C] (Dec. 5, 1983)). 
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overt and covert actions to destabilize neighboring states and attacks against 
South African and Namibian refugees.122 
In the 1970s the General Assembly passed three resolutions condemning 
Portuguese aggression for its illegal occupation of parts of Guinea-Bissau 
and repeated military actions against Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.123 
Finally, the General Assembly has branded several Israeli actions acts of 
aggression.  These include:  “any military occupation, however temporary, 
or any forcible annexation of such territory [Palestine], or part thereof, as an 
act of aggression” and continuing actions there,124 its attack against Iraqi 
nuclear facilities,125 its June 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and its occupation 
of the Golan Heights.126 
Finally, the General Assembly condemned Serbia and Montenegro’s 
1992 military incursions into Bosnia and Herzegovina as “aggressive 
acts.”127 
Again, these designations betray a preference toward finding acts of 
aggression when a state has violated another’s territorial sovereignty and, 
again, they concentrate on particular pariah or politically targeted states.128  
Thus, the UNGA too seems an inapt institution for generating a definition 
of the crime of aggression that is fair to potential defendants and can serve 
to guide prosecutions in an even-handed way. 
d.   International Court of Justice and the Act of Aggression 
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations.129  As such, its findings and decisions contribute to the 
international legal standard.130  The court has twice taken legal disputes 
implicating alleged acts of aggression.131 
The first was Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (1986),132 a case concerning Nicaraguan allegations that the 
United States had perpetrated armed attacks against it in violation of 
 
 122. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 39/72G, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/72[G] (Dec. 13, 1984)). 
 123. Id. at 246–47 (citing G.A. Res. 2795 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/8549 (Dec. 10, 1971); 
G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII), at 2–3, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2163rd plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. 
A/L.702 (Nov. 2, 1973)) U.N. Doc. A/RES/3061 (Nov. 2, 1973); and G.A. Res. 3113 
(XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/9338 (Dec. 12, 1973)). 
 124. Id. at 247 (citing G.A. Res. 3414 (XXX), at 6-7, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2429th 
plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/L.783 (Dec. 5, 1975)). 
 125. Id. at 248. 
 126. Id. at 249–50. 
 127. Id. at 250–51. 
 128. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. 
 129. U.N. Charter art. 92. The court is authorized to make legal advisory opinions when 
the UNGA, UNSC, or a UNGA-authorized entity requests it. Id. at art. 96.  In practice, these 
cases often involve international disputes between states.  For a list of such cases, see 
Contentious Cases, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3. 
 130. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 131. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 262–63. 
 132. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).  For a detailed discussion of this case and its ramifications on the crime 
of aggression, see MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 68–69. 
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international law.133  Two parts of the ICJ decision are relevant to clarifying 
the legal concept of “aggression.”  Firstly, the court held that the definition 
of aggression contained in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) article (3), section (g) 
was “customary international law,” increasing the Resolution’s importance 
and visibility.134  Second, the court emphasized that not all uses of force 
constituted aggression when it differentiated the concept from “less grave 
forms of the use of force.”135  In so doing, it gave support to the 
aforementioned use of force hierarchy and legal consequences.136 
In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (2005),137 the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accused Uganda of committing 
acts of aggression against its territory when it invaded, attacked, and 
occupied DRC territory in violation of Resolution 3314 (XXIX)’s article 1 
and the U.N. Charter’s article 2.138  While the court used the same part of 
Resolution 3314 it had used in the Nicaragua case to conclude that the 
DRC had sent no armed bands or irregulars against Uganda, its final 
judgment made no specific determination on acts of aggression.139 
3.   General Principles:  The Struggle to Define Aggression 
In addition to Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and 
ICJ decisions, the young United Nations initiated two committees 
concerned in whole or in part with defining the crime of aggression.  These 
committees were the International Law Commission (ILC) and a group that 
General Assembly Resolution 2230 created to define both the act and crime 
of aggression.140 
a.   The ILC Path 
In the years following World War II, the U.N. sought to create a 
permanent court—on the model of the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals—
that would hold leaders criminally liable for violations of international 
law.141  To that end, General Assembly Resolution 378/B (V) in November 
1950 created the ILC and charged it with producing an international 
criminal code.142  As early as 1954, its draft code of international crimes 
 
 133. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 262. 
 134. Id. at 263; see also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195. 
 135. MCDOUGALL, supra note 99, at 68 (citing Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 191) (“Alongside 
certain descriptions which may refer to aggression, this text includes others which refer only 
to less grave forms of the use of force.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19). 
 138. U.N. AGGRESSION, supra note 95, at 263–64. 
 139. Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 223, 280–83. 
 140. Oscar Solera, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression:  Lessons Not Learned, 42 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 801, 805–06 (2010). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime of Aggression:  Is There an Answer to the 
International Criminal Court’s Dilemma?, 65 A.F. L. REV. 229, 239 (2010); Leanza, supra 
note 30, at 5. 
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included individual liability for committing “acts of aggression.”143  The 
ILC was soon blocked from fulfilling its mandate, however, amid the early 
Cold War’s tense political climate and both Soviet and American concerns 
over how international prosecution would undermine sovereignty.144  The 
lofty goals of defining these contentious legal issues lay dormant until 1996 
when, in a more favorable political climate, the ILC was reinstated and 
issued a draft code.145  The draft drew upon the Nuremberg judgment and 
the U.N. Charter as the “main sources of authority with regard to individual 
criminal responsibility for acts of aggression,” but ignored the 1974 General 
Assembly definition146 which it considered “overly political” and lacking in 
legal precision.147 
The ILC definition states that “[a]n individual who, as the leader or 
organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible 
for a crime of aggression.”148  The body did not attempt to define 
“aggression committed by a State,” finding it “beyond the scope of the 
code.”149 
b.   The Path to Resolution 3314 
Partially in recognition that its original hopes for an ILC definition had 
become a lost cause, the General Assembly created a separate committee 
charged with crafting a definition of acts and crimes of aggression.150  The 
committee’s efforts were formalized in December 1974 with UNGA 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX).151  That resolution defined aggression as “the use 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations.”152  In an unprecedented attempt at 
an explicit definition, the resolution lists seven specific acts that qualify as 
prima facie acts of aggression:  (1) the invasion, attack, occupation, or 
annexation of another state’s territory, (2) the bombardment by the armed 
forces of a state against the territory of another state, (3) “the blockade of 
the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State,” (4) any 
attack by the armed forces of one state against another state’s armed forces, 
(5) the use of armed forces by one state against those of another state whose 
forces had been invited by a receiving third state, (6) a state allowing a 
second state to use its territory to attack a third state, and (7) a state sending 
 
 143. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 237–39. 
 144. Id. at 237; Leanza, supra note 30, at 6. 
 145. Fletcher, supra note 142, at 239. 
 146. See supra Part I.B.3.b. 
 147. Weisbord, supra note 37, at 170 (quoting Report of the International Law 
Commission, 48th Sess. Supp. No. 10, May 6–July 26, 1996, at 83–85, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 
(Jan. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ILC Report]). 
 148. Id. 
 149. ILC Report, supra note 147, at 42–43. 
 150. Leanza, supra note 30, at 6. 
 151. Id. 
 152. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9890 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
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“armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” against another state.153  
Additionally, the resolution notes that “[n]o consideration of whatever 
nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a 
justification for aggression.”154  Under the procedure set forth in the 
resolution, these acts would only be considered “acts of aggression” after 
the Security Council had so determined them.155 
Finally, the resolution states that a “war of aggression is a crime against 
international peace” giving rise to international responsibility.156  The 
resolution is, however, silent on the matter of whether any of the above 
“acts of aggression” would constitute a “war of aggression” or to what 
extent international responsibility would be incurred.157  In light of the 
differences between the terms, their usage in other documents, and their 
differentiation in this document, the two seem to be distinct. 
This definition gained prominence when the ICC adopted it to define 
“acts of aggression” as a prerequisite for the “crime of aggression.”158 
c.   Aggression in Domestic Law 
The crime of aggression has found further recognition in the general 
principles of civilized states through domestic legal rulings.  The United 
Kingdom’s House of Lords considered it in R v. Jones and Others.159  In 
that case, two peace activists used a 1977 law—which provided that a 
person may use reasonable force to prevent a crime—as a defense against 
criminal charges for breaking into a British military base to damage fuel 
tankers and, in so doing, preventing what they considered a crime of 
aggression against Iraq.160  While the court acknowledged the crime of 
aggression as a part of international law, it refused to recognize the crime as 
part of British criminal law without further legislative approval.161 
d.   Ad Hoc Trials:  A Lack of Aggression Considerations 
The crime of aggression proved entirely absent from twentieth century ad 
hoc trials.162  For instance, the United Nations created ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to address 
past atrocities.163  The tribunals were based on the precedent cases at 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 143–44. 
 155. The UNSC may decide that the acts or their consequences are not of “sufficient 
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 158. See supra Part I.B.1.b (discussing Kampala definitions). 
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 161. Id. at 173. 
 162. Id. at 169. 
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Nuremberg.164  Despite the World War II tribunals’ focus on aggression, no 
individual in either one of the modern tribunals was indicted on crimes of 
aggression.165  The courts instead chose to focus on genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes, possibly because both situations 
primarily involved “intra-national” rather than “international violence.”166 
In the First Gulf War—a conflict unambiguously involving international 
violence—while coalition forces considered holding Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein criminally liable for his invasion of Kuwait, the plan ultimately fell 
through.167  While the reasons behind this failure remain unclear, it seems 
that coalition forces may have decided that international sanctions against 
Iraq were a more fitting punishment than deposing and prosecuting the 
nation’s leader.168  A similar effort after the Second Gulf War was foiled 
when the Attorney General for England and Wales deemed the possibility 
of prosecution for the crime of aggression to be “remote” and due to 
political concerns in the U.S. and U.K. that prosecuting Hussein for 
aggression might eventually set a precedent that could be used against 
coalition participants.169 
C.   Bona Fide Humanitarian Intervention 
This Note is limited to “bona fide” forcible humanitarian intervention, 
also known as “unilateral humanitarian intervention.”170  Such action is 
defined as when a state (or group of states) uses military force against 
another state for the primary purpose of preventing widespread deprivations 
of human rights.171  Further, because intervention that is invited, Security 
Council-approved, or in self-defense is widely considered legal under 
international law172—and thus unlikely to be considered aggression in the 
first place—this Note deals only with circumstances where the UNSC has 
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been somehow prevented from solving the situation through its available 
means. 
NATO’s actions in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s are the 
seminal and most often used case to demonstrate such intervention.173  
During that campaign, NATO forces bombed Serbian militants and the 
Federal Yugoslav Republic Army in an effort to stop their murder of 
Kosovar Albanians.174  A Security Council sponsored action was not 
possible due to the ever-present threat of a Russian veto to protect their 
Serbian allies.175  Although many, both at the time and since, have decried 
the NATO campaign as a gross violation of international law,176 formal 
international legal channels mostly remained silent on the matter.177  Three 
days after NATO started its campaign, for instance, the UNSC refused a 
request to condemn the military action.178  After the bombing campaign and 
the peace that followed, an attempted UNSC resolution condemning 
NATO’s actions was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of twelve-to-
three.179  The UNSC actually tacitly approved NATO’s actions in its 
Resolution 1244 which endorsed an “international armed presence” in post-
conflict Kosovo and authorized it to exercise “all necessary means to fulfill 
its responsibilities.”180 
Whether unilateral humanitarian intervention, in general, is legal in 
international law falls outside the purview of this Note because states 
powerful enough to conduct such intervention have proven themselves 
willing to use such force even when that use is widely considered illegal.181  
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J. INT’L L. 641, 660 (2008). 
 174. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT (2000), available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303
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 175. See O’Connor, supra note 55, at 40 n.199. 
 176. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” in 
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NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 830–31 (1999). 
 178. See id. 
 179. See DeNicola, supra note 173, at 660; Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 830–31. 
 180. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 830. 
 181. Aaron Schwabach, Kosovo:  Virtual War and International Law, 15 L. & 
LITERATURE 1, 11 (2003) (noting that NATO states involved in the humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo provided no legal basis for their actions at an ICJ case brought 
against them and suffered no economic or military punishments as a result of their 
participation).  For further discussion on the legality of humanitarian intervention, see KEMP, 
supra note 11, at 64–70 (discussing international legal justifications of international law); 
Klinton W. Alexander, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo:  The Legal Case for Violating 
Yugoslavia’s National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 403, 449 (2000) (arguing that the intervention was legal); Ryan Goodman, 
Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 108–12 (2006) 
(noting that over 130 states have declared unilateral humanitarian intervention illegal 
through international statements); Griffiths, supra note 20, at 348–55 (summarizing the 
arguments of both sides before concluding against legality); Henkin, supra note 176, at 824–
28 (arguing for legality); Thomas H. Lee, The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect 
Civilians:  A Reinterpretation, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 251 (2014) (arguing that customary 
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Relevant, however, is whether the heads of state and government officials 
who plan and execute unilateral humanitarian intervention could be liable 
for a “crime of aggression.”182 
Under current international law, the answer is unclear.183  While the 
planning and execution could be analogized to the Tokyo and Nuremberg 
defendants, and they are certainly comparable to acts that the Security 
Council has branded “aggressive,” their determinations have been applied 
too inconsistently for a clear determination to be made.184  This threat of 
criminal liability could deter such intervention altogether allowing 
humanity’s most vulnerable groups to suffer or be slaughtered.185 
II.   THE POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO BALANCE HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION WITH THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
This part examines five possible solutions to the aforementioned 
ambiguities, allowing the crime of aggression to be prosecuted while 
exempting bona fide humanitarian interventions.  The solutions discussed 
here are both procedural186—redefining the crime of aggression’s 
prosecutorial processes—and substantive—discussing the possible 
definitions themselves.187 
A.   Substantive Solutions 
There are two substantive solutions:  strictly adhering either to the ICC’s 
Kampala Amendment or the definitions in UNGA Resolution 3314 and 
prosecuting accordingly. 
1.   Change ICC’s Kampala Amendment 
One possible solution to the problematic definition would be to give the 
ICC absolute jurisdiction over determining and prosecuting crimes of 
aggression.  This would allow the court to determine and investigate prima 
facie acts of aggression for possible criminal liability free from Security 
 
international law permits a sovereign state to use armed force to protect civilians facing 
imminent risk of group extermination in another sovereign state without UNSC authorization 
or self-defense justification); Mary Ellen O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What Is 
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n.68 (2012) (arguing that there is no right of humanitarian intervention without Security 
Council approval or self-defense necessity); Joshua L. Root, “First Do No Harm”:  
Interpreting the Crime of Aggression to Exclude Humanitarian Intervention, 2 U. BALT. J. 
INT’L L. 63 (2014) (arguing that bona fide humanitarian intervention is not a use of force 
prevented by U.N. Charter article 2(4)). 
 182. See, e.g., DeNicola, supra note 173; Murphy, supra note 170, at 341; O’Connor, 
supra note 55; Root, supra note 181; Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Aggression and 
Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Women, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2011). 
 183. See supra note 182. 
 184. See supra Part I.B.1.a. 
 185. Weisbord, supra note 37, at 220. 
 186. See infra Part II.B. 
 187. See infra Part II.A. 
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Council interference.188  Under its current “crimes of aggression” 
definition, the court would follow the guidance of UNGA Resolution 3314 
(XXIX)and then, through its own systems, determine which cases were 
severe enough to meet the necessary “manifest” threshold and prosecute 
individuals involved in the planning and execution accordingly.189 
Commentators have argued that there are a host of potential benefits to 
this plan.190  First, they argue that the ICC has already been set up and 
gained a degree of international legitimacy.191  A majority of the world’s 
nations have accepted its authority, and cases are already being tried under 
its auspices.192  Second, it eventually would provide a clear jurisprudence 
that would clarify for government actors the specific actions that could 
incur a crime of aggression indictment.193  Finally, the ICC is a court of law 
which can provide defendants with a fair investigation, indictment, and 
trial.194 
Others, however, note that numerous factors complicate any ICC attempt 
to exempt unilateral humanitarian intervention.  First, the current crime of 
aggression definition suffers from a distinct lack of clarity for humanitarian 
intervention purposes.195  Under the existing definitions, any bona fide 
humanitarian intervention would almost certainly qualify as a prima facie 
act of aggression under Resolution 3314’s list.196  Secondly, the ICC’s 
future use and legitimacy is far from a foregone conclusion since seventy-
five states have yet to ratify the Rome Statute.197  These include China, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States—some of the 
world’s most militarily and economically powerful states.198  The United 
States’ refusal to sign on and subsequent active efforts to undermine the 
ICC have garnered the most attention.199 
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Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510 (2003); 
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Furthermore, even existing ratifiers have criticized the court.  In 2013, 
the African Union (AU) held a special meeting to address the ICC’s 
perceived anti-African bias and consider whether all thirty-four of the AU 
states that have ratified the Rome Statutes should withdraw from the treaty 
all together.200  While no such withdrawal came about, the AU did agree to 
a resolution stating that no sitting African head of state should be made to 
appear before the court and demanded that existing Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta’s ICC case be deferred, effectively undermining the ICC’s 
authority.201 
Finally, as the proposed amendment is written, it is unclear how an act of 
aggression could become something severe enough to be prosecutable.  A 
particular concern is the term “character” which some scholars argue is 
unclear beyond meaning separate from a “violation of the Charter,”202 
while others have called it effectively meaningless and at the complete 
discretion of the court.203  Still others have criticized the lack of definition 
for “manifest” within the charter and called the “gravity” and “scale” 
criteria inadequate since they provide nothing but a highly subjective 
threshold test,204 while another has called it “particularly vague.”205  
Additionally, scholars question both the validity and usefulness of the 
“Understandings.”206 
Additionally, the court’s legal interaction with the Security Council is 
extremely ambiguous.207  Though it was the clear intention of numerous 
 
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 47 (2002); Meghan E. Lantto, The United States and the International Criminal 
Court:  A Permanent Divide?, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 619 (2008). Of particular 
note is the so-called Hague Invasion Act, a federal law that, along with restrictions on 
international peacekeeping and military aid for ICC countries who refuse to exempt 
American military personnel from extradition, allows the President to use “all means 
necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any [US or allied personnel] being 
detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal 
Court.” See American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7402, 7424, 7427 
(2012). 
 200. James Bullock, AU and the ICC—How They Voted, THINK AFRICA PRESS (Oct. 15, 
2013), http://thinkafricapress.com/legal/au-and-icc-how-they-voted. 
 201. Mark Doyle, African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24506006.  Kenya’s parliament 
had already voted to withdraw from the ICC a month prior to the meeting. Gabriel 
Gatehouse, Kenya MPs Vote to Withdraw from ICC, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23969316. 
 202. O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 181, at 204. 
 203. Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression, 20 EURO. J. INT’L L. 
1117, 1121 (2010). 
 204. Solera, supra note 140, at 808. 
 205. O’Connor, supra note 55, at 35. 
 206. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text; see also David Scheffer, The 
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state parties that the ICC be jurisdictionally independent from the UNSC,208 
the legality of this position is controversial.  Firstly, if, as article 8 bis(2)’s 
second paragraph states, an act of aggression shall be determined “in 
accordance” with UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), then any such 
determination is contingent on UNSC approval.209  The Kampala 
Amendment’s Understanding 6 seems to reinforce such an interpretation as 
its language mirrors Resolution 3314 article 2 closely.210  Furthermore, 
because the U.N. Charter’s language suggests that the Security Council has 
authority to determine an act of aggression, many scholars have interpreted 
it as the exclusive body with such a right211  Other scholars have rejected 
this exclusivity interpretation.212  Even assuming that the Security Council 
does not hold this power, however, the amendment seems to indicate that 
the Council can unilaterally alter the ICC’s jurisdiction.  A strict article 15 
bis reading suggests that the prosecutor determines there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with a crime of aggression investigation and notifies the 
U.N. Secretary General, who then seeks a Security Council 
“determination.”213  What exactly it means to make a “determination” and 
how it affects the ICC prosecutor’s investigation and the court’s 
proceedings remains ambiguous.214  Whatever the meaning, after the 
Security Council has made such a determination, the prosecutor can 
proceed with the investigation.215  Should the Council opt not to make a 
determination or somehow be prevented from doing so, the prosecutor must 
wait for six months before proceeding with the investigation.216  Outside of 
any of this, the Security Council can invoke its article 16 powers to further 
delay ICC investigations.217  There exists, however, no specific provision 
for what happens when the Security Council makes a negative 
determination, which is technically allowed in the amendments.218  
Scholars have argued that these different treatments make no sense if 
“determination” is used to mean anything other than “a positive 
determination.”219  Indeed, if whether the Council makes a positive or 
negative finding has no effect on the prosecutor’s investigation, then 
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requiring a six-month waiting period when the Council has remained silent 
is redundant.220 
2.   Use UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 
Another possible standard by which the crime of aggression may be 
determined is a strict adherence to Resolution 3314.  This approach has the 
advantage of emerging out of an international effort and being recognized 
as customary international law in whole by numerous legal scholars and in 
part by the ICJ.221 
However, this resolution also has been severely criticized.    Writing at 
the time of its passage, Julius Stone noted that it “appears to have codified 
into itself (and in some respects extended) all the main ‘juridical loopholes 
and pretexts to unleash aggression’ available under preexisting international 
law, as modified by the UN Charter.”222  More recently, Gerhard Kemp 
called the resolution “not a very successful attempt to define aggression” 
from an international criminal law perspective.223  The main concerns 
voiced are that the definition lacks clear actus reus (criminal act) and mens 
rea (criminal intent) guidance to make it a viable individual criminal 
liability.224  Concerning actus reus, articles 1 through 4 define aggression in 
terms far too vague to be bases for criminal law.225  The mens rea is 
completely absent making the required mental state a mystery and totally 
undermining the definition’s usefulness.226  These points are vital to any 
code to be used for international criminal liability, since proving these two 
elements are a key aspect of domestic laws around the world.227  At both 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the “threat of force” was a central part of the crime 
of aggression but does not even appear within this resolution’s text.228  
Furthermore, this omission runs contrary to the World War II tribunal 
precedents in customary international law since both had these elements of 
criminal prosecution.229  Finally, the history of the resolution and its nature 
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suggest that states passing it intended for it to be a guide for the Security 
Council, not a basis for criminal prosecution.230 
B.   Procedural Solutions 
The legal ambiguity of a crime of aggression, as it relates to humanitarian 
intervention, has at three potential procedural solutions:  (1) having the 
UNSC exclusively determine a crime of aggression, (2) having the UNGA 
or the ICJ determine a crime of aggression, and (3) allowing a crime of 
aggression exemption where intervention involves regional multilateral 
participation. 
1.   UNSC Approval 
One possible solution to the conflict is for the Security Council to 
exclusively determine both acts and crimes of aggression.  This solution 
would be in line with the Council’s existing powers to determine an act of 
aggression under U.N. Charter article 39 which, as mentioned below, some 
believe grants the Council exclusive power to determine an act of 
aggression.231  Others believe that since aggression is so contentious an 
issue, it is best left to a political body, like the UNSC, rather than a judicial 
one.232 
Other scholars argue that the council does not have exclusive authority to 
determine acts or crimes of aggression.233  They argue that article 39 of the 
U.N. Charter maintains that the UNSC authority over acts of aggression is 
solely for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security, not 
for establishing criminal liability.234  These scholars also point to article 
24’s language stating that U.N. members “confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” as implying central, but not exclusive, rights to determine 
aggression.235 
Among the concerns scholars have voiced against putting this power in 
the UNSC’s hands are, firstly, that such a solution leaves a political body to 
apply a strictly legal test, no doubt resulting in a myriad of political and fair 
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trial issues.236  Since the five permanent members of the Council each have 
veto power over any decision, determining a crime of aggression would 
require the agreement of China, France, Russia, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom.  This would restrict any such determination to essentially 
a broad multilateral agreement palatable to the national and political 
interests of these five nations.237  The result, some scholars argue, is a 
system so incapable of making a determination on aggression that the 
Council will often understate the severity of a situation just to gain 
consensus.238  Indeed, historically, even in the most serious situations, the 
Security Council has shied away from using the term “aggression,” and 
instead branded most actions as less severe “[t]hreats to international peace 
and security.”239  Furthermore, as mentioned above, where the council has 
determined that an act of aggression exists, such decisions have an obvious 
political slant.240  Moreover, the Council has even passed resolutions that 
are largely inconsistent with international law, undermining any credibility 
that they could put political priorities over legal ones.241 
Additionally, Carrie McDougall—in her thorough study of what the 
UNSC has called aggression—has identified dozens of potential cases that 
the Council has ignored while focusing on other, seemingly less severe 
ones, where politically unpopular states are the aggressors.242  Furthermore, 
she notes that the council has proved itself inconsistent on the severity of 
the acts it deems aggression.243  The term, originally meant to be reserved 
for only the most serious breaches of peace, has been used to describe 
targeted assassinations to full-scale invasion and everything in between.244  
While McDougall partially resolved this inconsistency by pointing out that 
the small-scale actions were almost always embedded in larger conflicts,245 
this standard of branding is nevertheless too inconsistent for criminal 
prosecution.246 
A Security Council–exclusive determination of an act or crime of 
aggression brings serious concerns over the accused’s ability to obtain a fair 
trial.247  For the ICC to guarantee the defendant a fair trial, the prosecution 
must prove each element of the offense, including whether the defendant’s 
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actions constitute an act of aggression in the first place.248  The Council, 
however, is not a judicial body; its decisions are political, not based on law 
and evidence, and thus are certain to fall below the standards of a fair 
trial.249 
2.   UNGA and/or ICJ Determination 
Where the Security Council fails to address a prima facie case of 
aggression, some have suggested that the General Assembly or the ICJ 
could make this determination instead.250  In the General Assembly’s case, 
authority for this plan comes from the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 
which allows the UNGA to condemn armed attacks and to authorize the use 
of force where the Security Council proves unable to reach a consensus.251  
The ICJ’s authority would come from its U.N. Charter article 96 mandate to 
advise on “any legal question.”252  Furthermore, as discussed previously 
and as commentators have pointed out, both bodies have a history of 
determining aggression.253  The diversity of voices and interests could also 
potentially alleviate many of the concerns voiced254 about a straight 
Security Council determination.255 
Opponents of the General Assembly/ICJ plan argue that the General 
Assembly is still a political body and, thus, that many of the most 
compelling reasons for avoiding the Security Council would remain 
unremedied.256  Furthermore, this system quickly could break down if the 
General Assembly refuses either to rule on an issue or to refer it to the 
ICJ.257  Finally, the assembly would suffer from the same lack of legal and 
evidentiary standards that would imperil the ability for the accused to obtain 
a fair trial.258 
3.   Regional Multilateralism 
Another possible solution is to exempt those who work with regional 
groups which carry out intra-regional humanitarian intervention from 
prosecution for crimes of aggression.  Such a solution has precedent:  the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) twice sent 
troops into Liberia and Sierra Leone—both ECOWAS member states—to 
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be. 
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intervene in domestic conflicts.259  While these interventions had no legal 
basis in the U.N. Charter, they were widely supported by the U.N., the 
Security Council, and the international community.260 
The Security Council praised ECOWAS in nearly every one of its fifteen 
resolutions and nine statements regarding the Liberian Civil War.261  The 
council went so far as to specifically exempt ECOWAS forces from 
Security Council Resolution 788 weapons importation embargo.262  It even 
formally recognized the ECOWAS forces as part of the peacekeeping effort 
in Resolution 866—a move Jeremy Levitt considers a “retroactive de jure 
seal on the ECOWAS intervention.”263 
Similarly, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone in 1997 after a military 
coup ousted the state’s democratically elected President.264  The President 
had officially requested an ECOWAS intervention to restore him to power 
just before fleeing his country.265  Security Council Resolution 1132 
imposed an arms and petroleum embargo against the military junta and 
sanctioned ECOWAS as an instrument to enforce the resolution’s terms.266  
After ECOWAS forces defeated the rebellion and restored the President to 
power, Resolution 1162 commended the organization’s actions.267 
Supporters of the regional multilaterism solution argue that regional 
organizations are more willing to engage in expensive military actions and 
are most likely to have the cultural, lingual, and political knowledge to 
know how best to address the inevitable challenges.268  The multilateral 
nature of these organizations “guard[s] against partiality, . . . avoid[s] 
escalation of conflicts by inadvertent provocation of important actors, 
and . . .  invoke[s] the authority of a broad normative community.”269 
One particularly illustrative example is NATO, which can claim the 
legitimacy of a multinational decision process whose guidelines, joint 
treaties, and agreements make it a relatively objective regime.270  As Sean 
Murphy argued regarding NATO’s actions in Kosovo, any prosecutor 
would surely be “influenced by the fact that this ‘unilateral’ humanitarian 
intervention involved sixteen NATO countries—fully democratic and 
therefore fully accountable to their people—collectively deciding that the 
intervention was justified as a matter of international law and policy.”271 
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Furthermore, any conflict severe enough to warrant a humanitarian 
intervention is also likely to affect neighboring countries due to the mass 
refugee emigration and peripheral violence likely to spill across borders.  
This gives regional states very real security concerns to address.  Refugees 
fleeing the humanitarian emergency in Yugoslavia, for example, burdened 
the “delicate political balance in Macedonia” and overwhelmed Albania’s 
aid capacity.272  While neither country was a NATO member at the time, 
they both shared (and continue to share) a border with NATO member 
Greece.273  They are also situated in an area where regional instability has 
historically had Europe-wide ramifications.  As such, any military 
intervention to quell these circumstances and stabilize the country could be 
justified under a self-defense rubric allowed by U.N. Charter article 51.274 
Opponents of this argument have noted that such intervention still 
violates the U.N. Charter.275  Aside from a common reading that military 
action is only legal when taken either in self-defense, by invitation, or with 
prior Security Council approval, article 53 explicitly allows regional 
organizations to intervene militarily only where the Security Council has 
approved such action.276  Such critics further point out that, as with the 
ECOWAS interventions, the Security Council has often remained silent at 
the time of the conflict and retroactively approved the regional 
organization’s actions.277  Finally, just because regional states agree on a 
decision does not mean that the group is unbiased against the leadership of 
a particular country or willing to use force for their own political will under 
the guise of humanitarian concerns.278 
III.   FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE:  RESOLVING THE ISSUES 
This part proposes an alternative to the current system to better balance 
aggression and compassion in international law.  It first proposes that the 
crime of aggression should be tried exclusively by the ICC.  It next urges 
that the Security Council should have no power that would dictate which 
acts the ICC may investigate as prima facie “acts of aggression” for which 
individuals may be criminally liable.  Finally, this part advocates for an 
affirmative humanitarian intervention defense for crime of aggression 
prosecutions to insulate those who use force with compassion against 
prosecution. 
A.   Give the ICC Exclusive Power 
The ICC should have exclusive power to prosecute crimes of aggression.  
The ICC is one of the few bodies capable of carrying out a fair trial for this 
 
 272. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 832. 
 273. Member Countries, NATO (Aug. 20, 2013, 9:32 AM), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/topics_52044.htm. 
 274. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 275. See supra note 172. 
 276. See U.N. Charter art. 53. 
 277. Wedgewood, supra note 177, at 832. 
 278. LeClerc-Gagne & Byers, supra note 36, at 386. 
1022 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
type of crime.279  It uses judges who make legal rulings and distinctions and 
who concern themselves with the rights of the indicted.  This makes the 
ICC a far better body to carry out a criminal trial and investigation than 
many other available options.280  It is also the sole international body that—
despite its flaws—has claimed jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution of 
aggression and made an attempt to define the crime and the conditions for 
liability.281  Furthermore, a majority of the world’s nations have approved 
the ICC’s legitimacy to investigate and prosecute such crimes.282  Though 
many major international states still take a strong stand against the body,283 
many of these same states are still interested in making the system work as 
evidenced by their active participation in the Kampala Amendment 
conference.284  Their objections need not doom the ICC’s future.  
Furthermore, even in the direst of situations—the ICC indicting a serving 
African Head of State—African Union members still chose to remain ICC 
parties rather than withdraw their support,285 proving the body’s 
international legitimacy and staying power. 
B.   Remove the Security Council 
The Security Council should have no power to deny an aggressive act’s 
existence or to block an ICC investigation.  First, as the Council itself has 
proven in the past, its aggression determinations are too heavily based on 
the political will of its five veto-wielding permanent members, and its 
determinations are concentrated against particularly convenient state 
villains for their involvement in a criminal investigation and prosecution to 
be desirable.286   To give this organization any additional power—let alone 
something as crucial as deciding who has committed acts and crimes of 
aggression—would undermine the usefulness and legitimacy of this type of 
prosecution and the ICC, as the body involved.287 
Second, to deny the Security Council the ability to determine an act of 
aggression for criminal liability purposes is in no way a violation of its U.N. 
Charter Chapter VII mandate.  As noted above, it is widely believed in 
customary international law that the Security Council’s power to determine 
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acts of aggression was never meant—and still is not meant—to be 
exclusive.288  Regardless, this mandate was certainly never intended to 
apply to international criminal prosecutions, but was meant—as the U.N. 
Charter plainly states—as a standard by which to “maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”289  Because any prosecution for the crime 
of aggression comes only after said crime has taken place, determining the 
existence of a crime and who has committed it has no direct role in 
maintaining or restoring peace and security. 
The Security Council’s role in ICC aggression investigation should be 
clarified so as to prevent the Council from blocking an investigation.  Such 
a path was, indeed, the majority will at the Kampala Amendment 
discussions, though this issue was largely tabled in the interest of finding a 
consensus.290  As mentioned previously, the Rome Statute’s proposed 
article 15 bis gives no explicit guidance on what happens when the Security 
Council determines that an act the ICC prosecutor wants to investigate is 
not aggression.291  Furthermore, giving the Security Council the ability to 
interfere with such an investigation indefinitely292 leaves justice 
subordinate to political concerns.  The Rome Statute should be amended to 
exclude this likely possibility. 
The political feasibility of this plan is, of course, problematic since it will 
deprive some of the world’s most politically, economically, and militarily 
powerful countries of control.  As the history of the Security Council has 
proven, however, there can be no justice or reliable and respected system 
for prosecution if a political body can dictate legal decisions.293  That a 
single country can block any action only makes a system involving the 
UNSC more dubious and incredible.  In the interests of justice and deterring 
aggression—the point of prosecuting the crime in the first place—the 
council should not be involved. 
C.   Include an Affirmative Defense 
In addition to these structural issues, the ICC should reform its crime of 
aggression definition.  The current definition is too broad, vague, confusing, 
and political to allow bona fide humanitarian interventions free from the 
specter of criminal liability.294  Because of the resolution’s own deference 
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to the Security Council, the procedure is too intertwined with political 
bodies to ensure ICC independence.295 
The most effective remedy to this issue would be to provide an 
affirmative defense exemption for humanitarian intervention.  Such an 
exemption would have two evidentiary tiers:  a “unilateral intervention” tier 
for humanitarian intervention that individual or a small group of states 
initiate and a “regional alliance” tier used when regional alliances or small 
groups of local nations initiate. 
This Note proposes that the “unilateral intervention” tier be crafted along 
the same lines as the exemption proposed by Elise Leclerc-Gange and 
Michael Byers.296  Under this plan, bona fide humanitarian intervention 
would be an affirmative defense in which the accused individuals would be 
required to prove all three of the following elements:  (1) a humanitarian 
principle motivation, (2) prior knowledge of gross human rights violations, 
and (3) a well founded belief in the Security Council’s impotence.297 
First, the defendant would have the burden of presenting evidence to 
show that her principal motivation for using force was “a genuine 
humanitarian desire to prevent gross human rights violations” and, finding 
such motivation, no individual criminal responsibility would be assigned.298  
The accused could prove such intent through evidence such as documents 
related to the planning and execution of the military action, diplomatic 
communications, and specific orders and illustrated efforts to avoid civilian 
casualties.299  This would allow the ICC to distinguish “bona fide” 
interventions from pretextual invasions or occupations.  Second, the 
accused would need to establish a prior knowledge that gross human rights 
violations—those which are “particularly severe”—were occurring in the 
target state.300  Third, the accused would have to prove she had a “well-
founded belief” that the Security Council was unable or unwilling to 
respond to the crisis for reasons unrelated to the accused’s (or his state’s) 
own threats or inaction.301  This would recognize the U.N. Charter’s 
preference for Security Council–sanctioned military action. 
This Note’s plan differs from the Leclerc-Gange and Byers 
recommendations in that it distinguishes interventions by regional alliances 
by requiring a more lenient standard of proof (and thus a more easily 
proven defense).  A defendant could escape liability by proving (1) their 
state’s own national security and self-defense were implicated and (2) their 
actions were narrowly-tailored to address those concerns.302  The former 
could be proven using statistics showing refugee flows, credible reports of 
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border incursions, harm to noncombatants in bordering states, or intra-
governmental documents showing intention.  The court itself could judge 
the latter using established precedent, reports from local defense 
departments and international organizations about their actions and goals, 
and the results of what actually took place.  This distinction for regional 
interventions recognizes (1) the subjective nature of proving a humanitarian 
intervention was bona fide, (2) the legitimate security concerns that states 
face, and (3) the legitimacy a regional organization gives. 
The benefits of a two-tier system are extensive.  First, the affirmative 
defense incentivizes states which would act alone or with scarce support to 
be extremely careful in how they conduct humanitarian interventions since 
their rationale will have to withstand strict legal scrutiny.  One could 
imagine the governments and defense departments of particularly active 
states setting up protocols by which information on their justification and 
actions is well recorded and collected.  Second, those states will have 
incentive to work through regional organizations near the troubled target 
state because of the relaxed legal standard.  Third, it would legitimize these 
types of interventions since regional groups will ostensibly be acting 
primarily to address their own security and self-defense concerns.  They 
could thus more credibly invoke the U.N. Charter’s self-defense exception 
to the otherwise legally troublesome use of force.303  Additionally, since 
U.N. involvement—through peacekeeping, development, and aid—almost 
inevitably follows any bona fide humanitarian intervention, and that 
involvement is usually heavily reliant on the cooperation of regional 
groups, a retroactive endorsement of the humanitarian intervention is far 
more likely.304  Fourth, the regional organizations need local knowledge 
and expertise and would mitigate the logistical challenges and costs 
inherent to any humanitarian intervention.305  Fifth, working in cooperation 
with regional groups would increase the popularity of such intervention in 
distant, powerful states through lessened risks for their personnel and a 
more limited financial involvement.  This, in turn, will make humanitarian 
interventions more frequent and, most importantly, save civilian lives.  
Finally, the two-tier system gives regional organizations an incentive to 
deal with potential humanitarian situations early enough to prevent more 
horrific and extensive atrocities because they will not be hindered by 
unclear or high evidentiary barriers. 
Finally, the two-tier solution is both realistic and practical since slightly 
modifying the ICC’s definition and relation to the Security Council does not 
require a huge rebalancing and reorganization of the U.N. Charter–
mandated prerogatives or require the enactment of a completely new legal 
organization. 
Applying this test to the above hypothetical and real life events may 
prove useful.  Indicted government and military officials from the coalition 
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that invaded Bellicosia would use the “unilateral intervention” tier, since no 
regional organizations were utilized.  They would thus have to submit 
evidence proving the Bellicosian government’s atrocities, their own 
government’s concern with them, and the threatened Security Council veto 
of the Bellicosian ally prevented the authorization of force through any of 
the international channels.  Leaders of a “lone wolf” regional state who 
invaded one of its neighbors—say, Vladimir Putin in Russia’s recent 
invasion of Ukraine—would be under the same tier and would have to 
prove that (1) evidence of the Ukrainian government’s atrocities against its 
own people, (2) the Russian invasion was due to these concerns, and 
(3) Russia was blocked in the Security Council from being able to get their 
military action authorized.  Such a defense would likely fail.  Even if 
Russia, or a country in a similar future situation, were to use a regional 
alliance which they effectively control to break into the lower tier—a 
situation the court would likely see through anyway—it likely would still 
fail since the defendant would have to prove both there was an actual threat 
to the national security of his or her country and that the invasion was 
narrowly tailored to address this problems.  An annexation or permanent 
occupation simply would not meet the guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
The easiest solution, of course, would be to abandon international 
criminal liability for the crime of aggression completely.  Indeed, doing so 
would avoid many of the inevitable political and legal battles to come.  
Though perhaps overly idealistic, individual liability for the crime of 
aggression is a piece of customary international law worth preserving and 
advancing.  It may be hard to imagine that such a system would work 
flawlessly in today’s world, but a system to legally punish planners and 
executors of wars of aggression is certainly a part of the world in which we 
wish we lived. 
Such a system, however, is doomed at the start if it is not crafted to the 
highest legal standards.  This is only possible if the system removes 
political bodies completely.  Furthermore, its legal standards must be clear 
enough to allow and incentivize humanitarian intervention in the horrible 
yet inevitable cases of necessity.  The two-tier formula outlined above 
would fulfill all of these needs. 
Perhaps, in our increasingly globalized world, where sovereignty—and 
thus aggression—increasingly has no meaning, we must deal with the 
realities of our current paradigm.  There will long be a need both to bring 
the world’s aggressors to justice and for powerful nations to use force to 
defend the world’s humanity.  If international law is to fulfill the goals that 
the post-World War II world had envisioned for it, a robust and 
unambiguous system to prosecute aggression while allowing the best uses 
of force is vital. 
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Appendix 1.  List of Officials Indicted on Aggression Charges                                       
at World War II Tribunals. 
 
 
Name Tribunal Result Major Positions During the War 
BORMANN Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Reichsleiter; Chief of Staff, Office of 
Führer’s Deputy; Head, Party Chancellery 
DONITZ Nuremberg Guilty Head of State; Commander-in-Chief, 
German Navy 
FRANK Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Reichsleiter; President, Academy of 
German Law 
FRICK Nuremberg Guilty Minister of the Interior; Reich Protector of 
Bohemia and Moravia 
FRITZSCHE Nuremberg Not Guilty 
Director, Wireless News Service 
Ministry; Head of Radio Propaganda 
Ministry 
FUNK Nuremberg Guilty 
Minister of Economics; President of 
Reichsbank; Member, Central Planning 
Board 
GORING Nuremberg Guilty Commander-in-Chief, German Air Force; 
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan 
HESS Nuremberg Guilty 
Member, Secret Cabinet Council; 
Member, Council for the Defense of the 
Reich 
JODL Nuremberg Guilty Chief, National Defense Section; Chief, 
Operations Staff 
KALTENBRUNNER Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Head, German Secret Police; Head, Reich 
Security Office 
KEITEL Nuremberg Guilty Chief, High Command of the Armed 
Forces 
RAEDER Nuremberg Guilty Admiral 
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Name Tribunal Result Major Positions During the War 
ROSENBERG Nuremberg Guilty 
Head, Nazi Ideological & Educational 
Research; Minister, E. Occupied 
Territories 
SAUCKEL Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
High Officer, German Secret Police; 
Member, Reichstag 
SCHACHT Nuremberg Not Guilty President of the Reichsbank; Minister 
without Portfolio 
SEYSS-INQUART Nuremberg Guilty Austrian Minister of Security and Interior 
SPEER Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Minister for Armaments and Munitions; 
Member, Central Planning Board 
STREICHER Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Member, Reichstag; Editor, Anti-Semitic 
Weekly Newspaper 
von NEURATH Nuremberg Guilty Minister of Foreign Affairs; President, 
Secret Cabinet Council 
von PAPEN Nuremberg Not Guilty Ambassador to Turkey 
von RIBBENTROP Nuremberg Guilty Minister of Foreign Affairs 
von SCHIRACH Nuremberg 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Leader, Youth in the German Reich; 
Governor & Defense Commissioner of 
Vienna 
ARAKI Tokyo Guilty General; Minister of Education; Minister 
of War 
DOHIHARA Tokyo Guilty General; Minister of Education; Minister 
of War 
HASHIMOTO Tokyo Guilty Army Officer 
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Name Tribunal Result Major Positions During the War 
HATA Tokyo Guilty 
Commander, China Army; Inspector 
General of Military Education; Minister of 
War 
HIRANUMA Tokyo Guilty 
Home Minister; Minister without 
Portfolio; President, Privy Council; Prime 
Minister 
HIROTA Tokyo Guilty Foreign Minister; Prime Minister 
HOSHINO Tokyo Guilty Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; Minister 
w/o Portfolio; President, Planning Board 
ITAGAKI Tokyo Guilty 
Chief of Staff of the China Army, 
Commander of the S.E. Asia Army; 
Minister of War 
KAYA Tokyo Guilty Finance Minister 
KIDO Tokyo Guilty Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; Minister of 
Education 
KIMURA Tokyo Guilty Commander, Burma Army; Chief of Staff, 
Kwangtun Army; Vice War Minister 
KOISO Tokyo Guilty Chief of Staff, Kwangtun Army; Governor 
of Korea; Prime Minister 
MATSUI Tokyo 
Guilty 
(Other 
grounds) 
Commander, Shanghai Expeditionary 
Force 
MINAMI Tokyo Guilty Commander, Kwantung Army; Governor 
of Korea 
MUTO Tokyo Guilty Chief, Military Affairs Bureau; Chief of 
Staff, Philippines Army 
OKA Tokyo Guilty Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau  at the Naval 
Ministry 
OSHIMA Tokyo Guilty Military Attache, Berlin Embassy; 
Ambassador to Germany 
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Name Tribunal Result Major Positions During the War 
SATO Tokyo Guilty Chief, Military Affairs Bureau 
SHIGEMITSU Tokyo Guilty Foreign Minister 
SHIMADA Tokyo Guilty Naval Minister 
SHIRATORI Tokyo Guilty Advisor to Foreign Office; Ambassador to 
Italy 
SUZUKI Tokyo Guilty Minister w/o Profile 
TOGO Tokyo Guilty Foreign Minister 
TOJO Tokyo Guilty 
Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army; Prime 
Minister; Minister of War; Vice Minister 
of War 
UMEZU Tokyo Guilty 
Commander, Kwantung Army; 
Commander, Northern China Army; Vice 
Minister of War 
 
